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Abstract—The advances of cloud computing, fog computing
and Internet of Things (IoT) make the industries more pros-
perous than ever. A wide range of industrial systems such as
transportation systems and manufacturing systems have been
developed by integrating cloud computing, fog computing and
IoT successfully. Security and privacy issues are a major concern
that hinders the wide adoptions of these novel techniques. In
this paper, we focus on assured data deletion, an issue which is
important but received less attention in academia and industry.
We firstly propose a framework to integrate the cloud, the
fog and the things together to manage the stored data from
industries or individuals. We then focus on secure data deletion
in this framework by proposing an assured data deletion scheme
which fulfills fine-grained access control over sensitive data and
verifiable data deletion. Only the data owners and the fog
devices are involved when deleting a data key and validating
the data deletion, which makes the protocol practical due to
the features of low latency and real-time interaction of fog
computing. The proposed protocol takes advantage of attribute-
based encryption and is provably secure under the standard
model. The theoretical analysis shows the good performance
and functionality requirements while the implementation results
demonstrate the feasibility of our proposal.
Index Terms—Fog computing, assured deletion, access control,
attribute-based encryption.
I. INTRODUCTION
CLoud computing [1], a type of novel computing paradigmwhich provides shared processing resources and data
to computational devices on demand, has made our lives
more convenient and easier. For example, the cloud can turn
a resource-constrained mobile device into a supercomputer,
which means that we can get super computational power to
analyse virtually any type of information wherever we are,
from the cloud. As a result, people can benefit a lot by employ-
ing cloud computing services. We take software as a service
as an instance. Currently, people are enjoying the convenient
services provided by Google map, Facebook, Youtube and
so on. Cloud computing has a number of benefits such as
savings in the cost of upgrades, easy scalability, flexibility in
data access, regular backups and disaster recovery. However,
there exist two drawbacks namely security and centralization
in cloud computing [2].
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Cloud computing clearly creates effective economies of
scale by using simple centralized architectures. However, tra-
ditional cloud computing centralization [3], [4], [5], including
centralized data storage and data processing, may lead to some
limitations. The first limitation is the loss of privacy [6] due
to outsourcing data to a centralized server and the second
one is centralization which may cause unreliable latency, lack
of mobility support and location-awareness. These inherent
problems of cloud computing might hamper human-centered
designs, which allow blurring the boundaries between human
and machines to emerge more interesting applications.
Amounts of data are produced at the edge of the network,
thus, it is more efficient to do computations on the data at
the edge of the network. Several emerging techniques such
as cloudlet and fog computing [7] have been developed since
cloud computing is not always efficient enough for data pro-
cessing when data is generated at the edge of the network. Fog
computing has emerged as a promising technology that can
push the frontier of computing applications, data processing,
and services out of the centralized data centers and down
to the logical periphery of the network. This is extremely
beneficial when considering the decreased pressure on network
bandwidth and communication latency.
Internet has provided so much convenience to our modern
society. People in today’s generation are relying on the internet
for many different tasks, e.g., work, entertainment, shopping. It
has been a common trend that electronic devices are equipped
with Internet connection. Internet of things (IoT) [8] is a
collection of “things” embedded with electronics, software,
sensors, actuators, and connected via the Internet to collect
and exchange data with each other. The applications and
services running on IoT devices [9][10] are connected to the
Internet and may need to send their collected data to powerful
servers for processing or analytics. If these aggregated data
are in huge volume and the processing task is time-sensitive,
the traditional centralized processing would cause a heavy
burden on network bandwidth and also may fail the real-
time requirement considering the distance between the central
data center and the requestor. Fog computing, instead, shifts
the workloads away from the centralized data centers and
clouds (i.e., “core” nodes) to the decentralized fog nodes
deployed geographically near the IoT devices that requested
for resources.
Fog computing is a highly virtualized platform that pro-
vides storage, computing and networking services between the
end devices and cloud centers [11]. The advantages of fog
computing such as location awareness, low latency, support
for mobility and predominance of wireless access make it a
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2suitable platform for applications in many domains, such as
IoT, software defined networks, wireless sensors and actuators
networks. In the framework of fog computing [7], each smart
thing is attached to one of fog devices. Fog devices can be
interconnected and each of them is linked to the cloud. There
is a fruitful interplay between the cloud and fog, especially
when it comes to data management and analytics.
Fog computing offers a promising opportunity to build pow-
erful industrial systems by taking advantage of the growing
ubiquity of smart things of IoT [12][13]. For example, IoT
has been adopted in the healthcare service industry to improve
healthcare service quality. In healthcare scenario, medical
sensors carried by patients monitor the parameters such as
blood pressure, breathing activity that can be processed and
provide guidance to the healthcare staff. Data privacy here
is major concern that hinders the general adoption of fog
computing. For example, the data should be accessible only
to authorized users for the reason that obtaining inaccurate
and wrong medical data may lead to wrong treatments and
it will cause privacy violation if everyone can access the
data. Broadcast encryption [14], [15], [16], [17] is a choice
to achieve the goal that an encrypted data can be decrypted
by a number of different authorized users, but it requires an
encryptor to have the prior knowledge of every prospective
receiver as well as the authorization information associated
with each receiver. Attribute-based encryption [18], [19] is
a highly promising cryptographic primitive to achieve fine-
grained access control [20], [21], [22], [23], by which only the
users whose attributes satisfy the access structure embedded
in the ciphertext can decrypt the ciphertext.
Besides fine-grained access control, data security is another
concern in fog computing since a user will lose control over
their outsourced data. Prior research mainly focuses on the
existence of the data, i.e., data integrity, which has been well
resolved. We investigate a complementary problem, that is,
when a patient wants to delete his sensitive medical data
from an outsourced storage, how can he guarantee that the
deleted data will never resurface if he does not delete the
data by himself? This is a well-recognized issue but received
less attention than data integrity. A privacy-focused service
may wish to promptly and securely delete the data once
they have served their purpose. Network services may also
need secure data deletion simply to comply with regulations
regarding their users’ sensitive data. In 2014, the European
Union’s right to be forgotten forces companies to store users’
data in a manner that supports secure data deletion upon
request. Meanwhile, California’s legislation enforces similar
requirements. Assured data deletion is a natural and necessary
requirement in Fog computing especially for the confidential
data. However, secure data deletion is challenging since it is
much harder to prove non-existence of outsourced data than
to prove the existence of the data. The goal of assured data
deletion [24] is deleting data from a storage medium, so as
to make the data irrecoverable and prevent the adversary from
gaining access to them.
In the physical world, secure deletion can be realized easily:
confidential documents are shredded, sensitive information of
a file is selectively redacted. In the digital world, however,
assured data deletion seems simple but there are many tough
issues under the surface. Medium’s physical destruction such
as incineration or pulverization is an accepted approach if
the storage medium does not need to be reused. However,
secure deletion is not one-off event which deletes the all stored
data. Instead, it is common that secure deletion needs to be
implemented at a fine granularity and the system needs to
continue functioning normally. In fog computing, it needs the
trust to the platform since there is no technical proof, and the
infrastructure being out of users’ control makes them difficult
to verify the deletion of data. Now, file systems may implement
deletion simply by unlinking the files due to it can be done
by changing even only one bit. But this will result in the
full contents remain available. Deleted data can be regained
by means of data recovery technique, thus cannot achieve the
assured data deletion.
The cryptography-based approaches are encrypting data
before storage, thus, the data deletion problem is converted to
secure erasure of the related secret key. Perman [25] proposed
the first assured data deletion file system where each file is
created with an expiration time. In [25], the file is securely
deleted by removing the ephemeral keys corresponding to the
expiration time. However, it needs to determine the expiration
time of the key in advance. Moreover, the deletion of data
totally depends on the trusted Ephemerizer servers, which may
lead to single point failures. Geambasu et al. [26] presented
the Vanish, which is designed for the secure deletion of
communication over the Internet. In Vanish system, each
message is encrypted with a key, and the key is divided
into shares and stored in the Distributes Hash Table (DHT)
network. Nodes in the DHT remove the key shares that
reside in their caches for a fixed time, which leads to the
message inaccessible. However, in Vanish system, the deletion
is constrained by the node’s update cycle, and Vanish cannot
resist the Hopping attack and Sniffing attack. The Hopping
adversary can change the port number from time to time to
join the network to replicate the associated key components
(usually 16-51 bytes). By sniffing, the components of a key in
transit can be easily captured by the adversary. In 2012, Tang
et al. [27] generalized the time-based deletion to policy-based
deletion. In their scheme, each file is associated with a boolean
combination of atomic policies. A file is encrypted with a data
key, and the data key is further encrypted with the control keys
which are associated with policies. By revoking the policy, the
corresponding control key is deleted from the key manager
[28], who is responsible for key management [29], [30], [31].
The flaw of the FADE is that the key managers need to
perform complex decryption operations for each message, so
it is not suitable for large, dynamic user scenarios. Perito
and TSudik designed an assured deletion scheme [32] for
embedded devices with limited memory. It makes use of secure
code update which securely erase all data on the device and
then download the new code, but it fails to achieve fine-
grained, flexible deletion. Mo [33] proposed a fine-grained
assured deletion scheme by using key modulation function. In
the scheme, all data keys are derived from master key. When
a data key k needs to be deleted, the master key is changed
so that the k is unrecoverable, while other keys are attainable
3from the master key via running the modulator adjustment
algorithm. Readon et al. [34] used B tree to organize, access
and securely delete data. Both the data and B-Tree are stored
on the persistent storage medium in their scheme, and by
introducing a shadowing graph mutation, they prove that it
achieves secure deletion of data. But it needs to create the
arborescent structure for the data.
Our Contributions. To meet the requirements of fine-
grained access control and secure data deletion, in this paper,
we propose a ciphertext-policy based assured deletion (CPAD)
scheme. Smart objects are usually deployed for specific appli-
cations, which can be utilized to describe data accessibility by
encrypting the data with attributes owned by potential users.
The access structure in the ciphertext can be sophisticated
logic expressions on the attributes. In our protocol, considering
that the smart objects are usually resource-limited and ex-
pensive cryptographic primitives cannot be directly employed,
thus data are encrypted via symmetric encryption algorithm
such as AES. We call the key used in the symmetric encryption
the data key. Data key is then encrypted with an access
structure. The ciphertext of the data key and encrypted data are
uploaded to the closest fog device. The fog device then stores
the ciphertext of data key but uploads the ciphertext of data to
the cloud. We can realize the assured data deletion by attribute
revocation such that no user satisfies the access structure in
the ciphertext. Moreover, the fog device can respond a proof
by which the smart object can verify that the data are deleted
indeed. In summary, the contributions of this paper are three-
folds.
• The proposed protocol achieves fine-grained access con-
trol and assured deletion for data generated by smart
objects. Users are assigned a series of attributes. A
ciphertext is associated with an access structure, which
supports any linear secret sharing schemes. A ciphertext
can be decrypted only if the user’s attributes meet the
access structure in the ciphertext. Assured data deletion
is achieved by revoking an attribute in the ciphertext. The
fog device can return a proof, and the smart object is
convinced that the data are deleted if the received proof
is valid.
• The proposed protocol is provably secure under the
Decisional q-Parallel BDHE assumption. It is resistant
against unauthorized users’ collusion attack, that is, the
collusion of unauthorized users cannot lead to the disclo-
sure of data. Moreover, we remove the centralized trusted
service, i.e., key manager, in our protocol.
• We empirically evaluate the performance overhead of the
proposed protocol, which demonstrates CPAD is efficient
in terms of computation and communication overhead.
The implementation of the protocol shows the practica-
bility of CPAD in the real-world applications.
Organization: The remainder of the paper is organized as
follows. In section II, we review some preliminaries used in
our construction. In section III, we describe the system model,
adversary model and security requirements of our assured data
deletion protocol. We present our concrete construction in
section IV, followed by the security analysis of our scheme in
section V. Performance evaluation and implementation results
are given in section VI. We conclude this paper in section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review some fundamental backgrounds
used in the protocol, including bilinear pairings, Decisional
Parallel BDHE assumption, access structure, linear secret
sharing schemes and attribute-based encryption.
A. Bilinear Pairing and Complexity Assumptions
Definition 1. (Bilinear Pairing). A bilinear pairing [36] is a
map e : G × G → GT , where G, GT are two multiplicative
cyclic bilinear groups of prime order p. The map has the
following properties.
Bilinearity. For all h1, h2 ∈ G, and a, b ∈ Zp, e(ha1 , hb2) =
e(h1, h2)
ab.
Non-Degeneracy. e(g, g) /∈ 1,where g is a generator of G.
Efficient Computation. There exists an efficiently com-
putable algorithm to compute e(h1, h2) for all h1, h2 ∈ G.
Definition 2. (Decisional q-Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
Exponent assumption [37]). Choose a group G of prime order
p. Let g be the generator of G and a, s, b1, . . . bq be chosen
randomly from Zp. If an adversary is given ~y =
g, gs, ga, · · · , gaq , , gaq+2 , · · · , ga2q
∀1 ≤ j ≤ q, gs·bj , ga/bj , · · · , gaq/bj , , gaq+2/bj , · · · , ga2q/bj
∀1 ≤ k, j ≤ q, k 6= j, ga·s·bk/bj , · · · , gaq·s·bk/bj
it is hard to distinguish the e(g, g)a
q+1s from a random
element R in GT . We say an algorithm B that outputs
z ∈ {0, 1} has advantage  in solving Decisional q-Parallel
BDHE problem if
|Pr[B(~y, e(g, g)aq+1s) = 0]− Pr[B(~y,R) = 0]| ≥ 
The Decisional q-Parallel BDHE assumption holds if
no adversary has a non-negligible advantage in solving the
Decisional q-Parallel BDHE problem. The proof that the
assumption generally holds is in [37].
B. Access Structures
Definition 3. (Access Structure [38]). Let {P1, P2, . . . Pn} be
a set of parties. A collection A ⊆ 2{P1,P2,...Pn} is monotone
if ∀ B,C : if B ∈ A and B ⊆ C, then C ∈ A. An
access structure (respectively, monotone access structure) is a
collection (respectively, monotone collection) A of non-empty
subsets of {P1, P2, . . . Pn}, i.e. , A ⊆ 2{P1,P2,...Pn}\{∅}. The
sets in A are called the authorized sets, and the sets not in A
are called the unauthorized sets.
In our protocol, the parties are identified by the attributes.
Thus the access structure A contains the authorized sets of
attributes.
4C. Linear Secret Sharing Schemes
Definition 4. (Linear Secret Sharing Schemes (LSSS)[38]).
We recall the definitions of LSSS given in [38] as follows. A
secret sharing scheme Π over a set of parties P is linear if
• The shares for each party form a vector over Zp.
• There exists a matrix M with l rows and n columns called
the share-generating matrix for Π. For i =1, . . . , l, ρ(i)
is a function, which defines the party labeling row i. For
the column vector ~v = (s, r2, . . . , rn), where s ∈ Zp is
the secret to be shared, and r2, . . . , rn ∈ Zp are chosen
randomly, M~v is the vector of l shares of the secret s
according to Π. The share M~vi belongs to party ρ(i).
Linear secret sharing scheme enjoys the linear reconstruc-
tion property: Suppose that Π is an LSSS for the access struc-
ture A and S ∈ A is any authorized set. Let I ⊂ {1, 2, . . . l}
be the set that I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}. Then, if {λi}i∈I are
valid shares of secret s according to Π, there exist constants
{ωi ∈ Zp}i∈I such that
∑
i∈I ωiλi = s. And these constants
{ωi ∈ Zp}i∈I can be found out in time polynomial in the size
of share-generating matrix M .
Note: Using standard techniques [38], one can convert any
monotonic boolean formula (including access formulas in
terms of binary trees) into an LSSS representation. In our
protocol, we use the vector (1, 0, 0 . . . , 0) as the target vector
for linear secret sharing schemes. For any satisfying set of
rows I of M , the target vector is in the span of I . For any
unauthorized set of rows I of M , the target vector is not in
the span of I . Moreover, there exists a vector ~ω such that
~ω · (1, 0, 0 . . . , 0) = −1 and ω · ~Mi = 0 for all i ∈ I , where
~Mi is the i-th row of the matrix M .
D. Attribute-based encryption
The first attribute-based encryption scheme [39] was pro-
posed by Sahai and Waters. In attribute-based encryption
schemes, attributes have been exploited to generate Pub-
lic/Private key pairs for users, and have been used as an access
policy to control users’ access. Depending on the access policy,
attribute-based encryption schemes can be roughly categorized
as key-policy attribute-based encryption (KP-ABE) and cipher-
text policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) schemes.
The CP-ABE builds the access structure in the ciphertext
which can choose the corresponding user’s private key to
decipher encrypted data. It improves the disadvantages of KP-
ABE that the data owner cannot choose who can decrypt the
ciphertext. Moreover, a users’ private key corresponding to a
set of attributes, so the user can decrypt the ciphertext whith
the attributes, which satisfies the access structure. Thus, CP-
ABE is very close to traditional access control and can be
applied in a number of real-world applications.
In 2007, Bethencourt et al. [19] proposed the first ciphertext-
policy attribute-based encryption scheme, which consists of
four algorithms described below.
Setup(λ): This algorithm takes a security parameter λ as
input. It outputs the public parameters PP and a master key
MK.
Encrypt(PK,M,A): This algorithm takes as input the pub-
lic parameter PK, a message M and an access structure A.
The message is encrypted with the access structure A. This
algorithm outputs the ciphertext CT of M .
KeyGen(MK,S): This algorithm takes as input the master
key MK and a set of attributes S and outputs the private key
SK.
Decrypt(CT, PK, SK): This algorithm takes as input the
ciphertext CT which implicitly contains an access structure
A, public parameters PP and a private key SK, which is a
private key for a set of attributes S. If the set of attributes
satisfy the access structure A, then this algorithm decrypts the
ciphertext and outputs the message M .
III. MODELS AND REQUIREMENTS
In this section, we describe the system model, security
requirements and security model in fog based assured data
deletion.
A. System Model
We consider the scenario where there are many smart
objects generating or collecting data. Each smart thing is
connected to one of fog devices by a wireless access. Fog
devices could be interconnected and each of them is linked to
the cloud as shown in Fig. 1. There is an Attribute Authority
(AA), who is responsible for the system initialization and
attributes management in the system. AA publishes the system
parameters which are needed in encryption and assigns private
keys to the users. The cloud, which has powerful computing
and storage resources, provides data storage, access control
and data processing services for users. The fog devices allow
applications to run as close as possible to sensed, actionable
and massive data. It provides compute, storage and networking
services between end devices and traditional cloud servers.
We assume fog nodes are honest but curious, which means
it honestly executes the tasks assigned by legitimate parties
in the system. However, it would like to learn information
of the data in the cloud as much as possible. Smart objects,
such as sensors or embedded devices in IoT, generate data and
upload encrypted data to the fog devices and the cloud. Smart
objects cannot afford expensive computational operations due
to limited computing and storage capacity. Users, whose
attributes satisfy the access structure in the ciphertext, can
recover the data.
B. Security Requirements
We consider adversaries whose main goal is to obtain the
data which they are not authorized to access. The attackers
can eavesdrop all the communications in the system, and
unauthorized users may collude to compromise the encrytped
data. After the data are deleted, adversaries try to recover the
deleted data. The adversaries here include both authorized
users and unauthorized users. We assume fog devices are
honest, hence we do not consider attacks in which users
collude with fog devices.
For secure data storage and access, some common security
properties such as data confidentiality and integrity, should
be guaranteed. Here, we focus on two specific goals that
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Fig. 1: System model
CPAD seeks to achieve: secure fine-grained access control and
assured deletion of data.
Secure fine-grained access control: As mentioned previ-
ously, fine-grained data access control is always desirable
in many applications. The proper scheme should be able to
precisely specify the capability of different kinds of users to
access the data at different security levels. A user can decrypt
the ciphertext only when the attributes of the user satisfy the
access structure. Unauthorized users can not get access to the
sensitive data even they collude with each other.
Assured data deletion: The data should be permanently
inaccessible to users after data deletion. An adversary cannot
get any knowledge of the data even it can access the data
previously. The fog devices should return a deletion proof with
which the smart object can validate that the data have been
indeed deleted.
C. Security model
In the security model of assured deletion, the adversary
chooses an access structure A∗ at the beginning of the game,
such that the data key encrypted under the access structure A∗
is deleted in the end. The adversary can also query any secret
keys corresponding to the set of attribute S, such that S does
not satisfy A∗.
The security of the ciphertext-policy based assured data
deletion scheme is defined using the following game in which
an adversary and a challenger are involved.
Init: The adversary outputs an access structure A∗ in which the
dummy attribute is revoked, meaning the data key encrypted
under the access structure A∗ is deleted.
Setup: The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and give the
adversary public parameters PK.
Phase 1: The adversary makes a number of private key queries
corresponding to sets of attributes S1, . . . , Sq1 . The restriction
for each query is that none of the attribute set Si satisfies A∗.
Since the attribute “dummy” is revoked, the set of attribute Si
does not contain the attribute “dummy”.
Challenge: The adversary outputs two equal length messages
M0,M1 and sends them to the challenger. The challenger
picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and encrypts the message Mb
under A∗. Then the ciphertext CT ∗ is forward to the adversary.
Phase 2: The adversary issues additional private key queries
corresponding to the sets of attributes Sq1+1, . . . , Sq with the
same restrictions as in Phase 1.
Guess: The adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins if
b = b′.
The advantage of the adversary in attacking the game is
defined as Adv(A) = |Pr[b = b′] − 12 |. A ciphertext-policy
based assured data deletion scheme is secure if no polynomial
time adversary has a non-negligible success advantage in the
aforementioned game.
IV. OUR CONSTRUCTION
In this section, we describe a concrete construction that
fulfills the properties of assured data deletion and fine-grained
data access. In our protocol, we make use of the ciphertext-
policy attribute-based encryption. Attribute authority (AA)
initializes the system and publishes system parameters. We
denote the universe of all the attributes in the system by a
symbol U . There is an attribute “dummy”, which is included
in the set of attributes for each user and is an indispensable
attribute in the access formula. Each smart object is preloaded
the public parameter PP as well as a LSSS access matrix
M . The data generated by the smart object are encrypted
using a symmetric encryption algorithm. The data key is en-
crypted with the ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption.
The smart object uploads the ciphertext of data and encrypted
data key to a fog device, and deletes the local file. The fog
device keeps the ciphertext of the data key, and transfers the
ciphertext of data to the cloud. When the data generated by
the smart objects need to be deleted, the smart object sends
a deletion request to the fog device. The smart object and
the fog device can agree a secret deletion key via a key
exchange protocol. By utilizing the deletion key, the fog device
changes the ciphertext related to the attribute “dummy”, such
that users who can access the data previously cannot decrypt
the ciphertext. The fog device then sends a deletion request
to the cloud for deleting the ciphertext. It is fair to assume
the smart object can decrypt the data generated by itself. The
smart object can verify the deletion with the deletion key. Our
protocol is based on the Waters’ ABE construction [37], and
AA is not involved in the data deletion process.
Setup(1λ). AA chooses two multiplicative cyclic groups
G and GT of prime order p and a bilinear map e :
G × G → GT . Let g be a generator of G. AA picks
random exponents α, a ∈ Zp, and chooses a hash function
h : {0, 1}∗ → Zp. AA chooses |U | random group elements
h1, . . . , h|U | ∈ G that are associated with the |U | attributes
in the system. The public parameter is published as PP =
{g, e(g, g)α, ga, h1, . . . , h|U |, h}. AA sets MSK = gα as the
master secret key.
KeyGen(MSK,S): AA takes as input the master secret key
MSK and a set of the attributes S of a user, randomly picks
t ∈ Zp, and computes the private key of the user as follows.
K = gαgat, L = gt,∀x ∈ S,Kx = htx
6The private key of the user is SK = {K,L,∀x ∈ S,Kx}.
The smart object generates a signing public-secret key pair
{spk, ssk}. The fog device also generates a signing key pair
{fpk, fsk}. The signing algorithm can use short signature
where a user or a fog device picks a random sec ∈ Z∗p ,
and compute v = gsec. It also chooses a hash function
h1 : {0, 1}∗ → G\{1}. The spk is {v, h1}, and ssk is sec.
Encrypt(PP, (M,ρ),m, k). The smart object takes as input
the public parameter PP , data m to be encrypted, an LSSS
access structure AS = (M,ρ), and symmetric key k. M is an
l∗n matrix, and Mi denotes the vector corresponding to the i-
th row of M . The function ρ maps each row of M to different
attributes. The smart object picks a file name fname ∈ Zp for
the data randomly and the data are encrypted with a symmetric
encryption such as AES. {D}k represents the ciphertext in
which k is the symmetric data key. To encrypt the data key,
the smart object chooses random values r1, · · · , rl ∈ Zp
and a random vector ~v = (s, y2, . . . , yn) ∈ Znp , which is
for generating the shares of the encryption exponent s. For
i = 1 to l, it calculates λi = ~v ·Mi. The ciphertext of k is
CT = {C,C ′, {Ci, Di}1≤i≤l}, where
C = ke(g, g)αs, C ′ = gs
Ci = g
aλih−riρ(i), Di = g
ri
Then the smart object computes and preserves τ =
h(fname||k), and uploads {fname, spk, CT, {D}k, (M,ρ)}
to a fog node. Upon receiving the data, the fog node uploads
{fname, spk, {D}k} to the cloud.
Decrypt(CT, {D}k, SK): A user first obtains the ciphertext
CT from the fog device and {D}k from the cloud. Suppose
the set of attributes S satisfies the access structure AS in the
ciphertext, and let I ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , l}, I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S},
then {ωi ∈ Zp}i∈I can be calculated where {ωi}i∈I are
constants such that if {λi}i∈I are valid shares of secret s,
then
∑
i∈I ωiλi = s. The decryption process is as follows,
e(C ′,K)∏
i∈I(e(Ci, L)e(Di,Kρi))ωi
=
e(g, g)αse(g, g)ast∏
i∈I e(g, g)taλiωi
= e(g, g)αs
The user computes k as k = Ce(g,g)αs , and decrypts the data
with k.
DelRequest(fname, x): x denotes the attribute “dummy”.
When the smart object wants to delete the file named
fname on the fog device, it first chooses two random
numbers q, u ∈ Zp, and computes θ = qu mod p.
Then the smart object sends the deletion request DR =
{delete||fname||x||q||θ, signssk(h(delete||fname||x||q||θ))}
to the fog device.
ReEncrypt(CT,DR): Upon receiving the deletion request,
the fog device verifies the signature in DR. If the signature is
valid, the fog device transmits the deletion request DR to the
cloud. The cloud validates DR again. If the signature in DR is
valid, the cloud deletes {D}k. The fog device picks a random
v ∈ Zp, and computes η = qv (mod p), γ = θv (mod p).
Then the fog device updates the ciphertext Di in CT for the
index i that ρ(i) = x, where x denotes the attribute dummy,
as D′x = D
1
γ
x and sends Resp = {η, signfsk(η)} to the smart
object.
Verify(Resp,CT ′): Upon receiving the response Resp from
the fog device, the smart object first verifies the correctness of
the signature. If it is valid, the smart object computes γ′ = ηu
mod p, K ′x = K
γ′
x , and retrieve the updated ciphertext of k
which is CT ′ = {C,C ′, {Ci, D′i}1≤i≤l} from the fog device.
The smart object verifies the deletion as follows.
for ρ(i) = x : Bi = (e(Ci, L)e(D′i,K
′
x))
ωi
for ρ(i) 6= x : Bi = (e(Ci, L)e(D′i,Kx))ωi
The smart object computes A =
∏
i∈I Bi = e(g, g)
ats and
k′ = CA˙e(C′,K) .
Finally, it calculates τ ′ = h(fname||k′) and compares it
with τ . If τ ′ = τ holds, the smart object is convinced that the
ciphertext has been changed and the data is inaccessible.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We evaluate the security of the proposed protocol by show-
ing it satisfies all the security requirements described in section
III.
A. Secure Fine-grained Data Access Control
Secure fine-grained data access control ensures that only
users whose attributes satisfy the access structure in the
ciphertext can decrypt the ciphertext correctly. Even the unau-
thorized users collude, they cannot learn any information from
the ciphertext. In our protocol, data are encrypted with a
symmetric encryption algorithm. The security of the data can
be guaranteed by choosing a secure symmetric encryption
algorithm such as AES, which means without the data key, the
data is IND-secure. Our encryption of the data key is provably
secure under the q-parallel BDHE assumption. The proof
is similar to that of Waters’ scheme [37] and so we omit it
here. This turns out that the adversary is unable to decrypt the
data key unless it owns the intended attributes. Therefore, our
protocol can make sure that only authorized users can access
the data.
B. Assured data deletion
Assured data deletion ensures the irrecoverability of the data
when the data are deleted. Since data key is encrypted with
an access structure and the ciphertext of the data key is re-
encrypted, the new ciphertext can not be decrypted correctly
by the user’s private key, thus, the data is irrecoverable.
When the data are deleted, the security of data key can be
proved as follows.
Theorem 1. Suppose the decisional q-parallel BDHE
assumption holds in G and GT , there is no polynomial time
adversary A can break the security of our protocol with a
non-negligible advantage.
Proof : The adversary A claims a challenge matrix M∗,
and the size of M∗ is l∗ ∗ n∗, where l∗, n∗ ≤ q. Suppose the
7adversary has a non-negligible  in the selective security game
against our protocol, then we can construct a simulator B that
can solve an instance of q-parallel BDHE problem with a
non-negligible advantage.
B chooses groups G and GT with an efficient bilinear map e
and a generator g. The challenger flips a fair coin µ. If µ = 0,
the challenger sets the (~y, T ) = (~y, e(g, g)a
q+1s); Otherwise
it sets (~y, T ) = (~y,R) with a random R.
Init: A outputs the challenge access structure (M∗, ρ∗) in
which M∗ has n∗ columns. The data key encrypted under the
access structure is deleted in the end.
Setup: B chooses a random α′ ∈ Zp, and sets e(g, g)α =
e(ga, ga
q
)e(g, g)α
′
which implicitly sets α = α′ + aq+1.
For each attribute x, B chooses a random value zx. Let
X denote the set of indices i, such that ρ∗(i) = x, which
means that the ρ function may be not injective. Then B
programs hx as follows: If X = ∅, hx = gzx ; else,
hx = g
zx
∏
i∈X g
aM∗i,1/bi · ga2M∗i,2/bi · · · gan
∗
M∗i,n∗/bi .
Note that the outputs of the oracle are distributed randomly
due to the randomness of gzx .
Phase 1: A adaptively makes requests for the keys. Assume
B is given a private key query for a set of attributes S which
does not satisfy M∗. The attribute “dummy” is not included
in the set of attributes S for the reason that the data have been
deleted, the ciphertext corresponding to the attribute “dummy”
is re-encrypted, which leads to the key relevant to the attribute
“dummy” is invalid. Hence, in the adversary’s view, it has no
knowledge about the corresponding key.
B finds a vector ~ω = (ω1, . . . , ωn∗) such that ω1 = −1, and
for all i where ρ∗(i) ∈ S, ~ω ·M∗i = 0. By the definition of
LSSS, such a vector can be found in polynomial time. Then
B chooses a random r ∈ Zp and defines t as
t = r + ω1a
q + ω2a
q−1 + · · ·+ ωn∗aq−n∗+1.
Then B sets L as
L = gr
∏
i=1,··· ,n∗
(ga
q+1−i
)ωi = gt.
Since gα is unknown, it seems hard to calculate K. How-
ever, by the definition of t and ω1 = −1, gat contains a
term g−a
q+1
which can cancel out gα when calculating K.
B computes K as
K = gα
′
gar
∏
i=2,··· ,n∗
(ga
q+2−i
)ωi .
For {Kx}x∈S , if there is no i such that ρ∗(i) = x, B can
simply set Kx = Lzx . For the x which is used in access
structure, the terms of the form ga
q+1
/bi are hard to simulate.
However, we have M∗i ·~ω = 0, all these terms can be canceled.
B computes Kx as follows.
Kx = L
zx
∏
i∈X
∏
j=1,...,n∗
(
g(a
j/bi)r
∏
K=1,...,n∗
k 6=j
(ga
q+1+j−k/bi)ωk
)M∗i,j
Challenge: A submits two equal length messages M0,M1 to
B. B builds the challenge ciphertext as follows.
B flips a coin β. It computes C = MβT · e(gs, gα′) and
C ′ = gs.
The components Ci contains terms ga
js that B can’t calcu-
late. However, B can choose the secret splitting, which makes
these terms be canceled out. B chooses random y′2, · · · , y′n∗
and the vector ~v = (s, sa + y′2, sa
2 + y′3, . . . sa
n−1 + y′n∗) ∈
Zn∗p . Then B chooses a random key η and random values
r′1, . . . , r
′
l. For the index i that ρ(i) = x, where x denotes
the attribute “dummy”, B sets Di = (g−r′ig−sbi) 1η , otherwise,
Di = g
−r′ig−sbi . Denote Ri as the set of all k 6= i, i =
1, . . . , n∗ such that ρ∗(i) = ρ∗(k), which indicates the set of
all other row indices which map to same attributes as row i.
Ci is generated as
Ci = h
r′i
ρ∗(i)
( ∏
j=2,...,n∗
(ga)M
∗
i,jy
′
j
)
(gbi·s)−zρ∗(i)
·
( ∏
k∈Ri
∏
j=1,...,n∗
(ga
j ·s·(bi/bk))M
∗
k,j
)
B sends the adversary A CT ∗ = {C,C ′, {Ci, Di}i=1,2,···l∗}
as the challenge ciphertext.
Phase 2: Same as phase 1.
Guess: Finally, A outputs a guess β′ of β. If β′ = β, B outputs
0 indicating that T = e(g, g)a
q+1s. Otherwise B outputs 1,
which means T is a random elements.
In the case where µ = 1, A gains no knowledge about µ,
therefore, Pr[B(~y, T = R) = 1|µ = 1] = 12 . If µ = 0, then
the ciphertext is valid. We have
Pr[B(~y, T = e(g, g)aq+1s) = 0|µ = 0] = 1
2
+ .
Therefore, the overall advantage of B in the q-parallel
BDHE game is 2 , which is non-negligible.
Since that the decisional q-parallel BDHE assumption
holds in G and GT , the probability that the adversary breaks
the security of our protocol is negligible.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we first discuss the numeric results in terms
of computation and communication overheads, and then report
the implementation results.
A. Numeric Analysis
Computation cost: In our protocol, AA generates users’
private keys according to their attributes. Data are generated
and encrypted by the smart object, and decrypted by the users.
Data deletion is done by the fog devices. We present the com-
putation cost from the viewpoint of the AA, the fog device, the
smart object and the user. For simplicity, MG and EG denotes
the multiplication and exponentiation in group G and use
MGT , EGT to denote the multiplication and exponentiation
in group GT . Denote P the pairing computation. We ignore
the computation cost of the hash functions since it is negligible
compared with other expensive operations.
AA is responsible for generating public parameters and
private keys for users. Assume a user owns s attributes, the
computation cost of AA is (s+ 2)EG + 1MG. For the smart
object, the primary computation is generating the ciphertext of
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Fig. 2: Increasing size the access formula in ciphertext
the data key as the cost of the symmetric encryption is little.
For a share-generating matrix M with l rows, the dominated
cost of the smart object is 3lEG+lMG+1P+1MGT . The main
computation of users is decrypting the encrypted data key.
Suppose that the rows in M corresponding to the attributes
satisfying the access structure is i, the computation cost of
the user is (2P + 1MGT + 1EGT )i+ 2MGT .
Regarding data deletion, the computation cost of the fog
device is 2 exponentiations in Zp and 1 exponentiation in G.
When validating a deletion proof, the cost of the smart object
is (2P + 1MGT + 1EGT )i+ 2MGT + 1EG, where i denotes
the number of the rows in M that corresponds to the attributes
of the smart object.
Communication cost: After encryption, the smart object
uploads the {fname, spk, CT, {D}k, (M,ρ)} to the fog de-
vice. The size of {D}k is related to the data since data are
encrypted with symmetric encryption. The ciphertext size of
the data key is O(l), where l is the size of an access formula.
During the deletion process, the deletion request contains 4
group elements in Zp. The deletion proof returned from the fog
device includes two group elements in Zp. In the verification
phase, the smart object needs to retrieve the ciphertext of the
data key whose size is O(l), where l denotes the size of the
access formula in the ciphertext.
B. Implementation
In our implementation, we use SHA-1 as the one-way
hash function and AES as the data encryption algorithm. The
experiments were conducted with Miracl library [40] on Intel
i5-2450 MQ CPU @ 2.50 GHz. The size of AES keys is
128 bits and the security parameter is 80, which satisfies the
security requirements.
Since the dominated computation of the smart object is
encrypting the data key, we increase the size of the access
formula embedded in the ciphertext to assess the encryption
cost on the smart object side. In our experiments, we increase
the parameters of the share-generating matrix, l and n, simul-
taneously from 10 to 50 with an increment of 10 for each
test. We observe that the time cost of the encryption grows as
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Fig. 3: The time of key generation and decryption for
increased number of attributes of a user
the size of the access formula increases. As shown in Fig.
2, when there are 50 rows in the M , the encryption time
is about 150 ms, which is acceptable for the smart object.
From the Fig. 3, we can see that the time cost of the AA for
generating a private key for a user is small. When the user
owns 10 attributes, the time cost of AA is almost 28 ms. For
the user, the decryption time cost increases with the number
of attributes of the user. More specifically, the time cost is
proportional to the the number of the rows in M, which is
determined by the number of user’s attributes. The time cost
is approximately 180 ms if there are 10 attributes in the user’s
attribute set.
During the data deletion process, the time to generate the
deletion request for the smart object is small since there are
only one exponentiation computation. On the fog device side,
the time cost of producing a proof is small as well, because
only three exponentiation is needed. The main cost of the smart
object is to verify the proof returned from the fog device,
which is almost the same as the decryption cost. Fortunately,
it is a one time computation for a unique file. As shown in Fig.
4, it consumes about 115 ms, 144 ms, 180 ms respectively if
the smart object has 6, 8, 10 attributes, which is bearable to
the smart object.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated an essential but challenging
issue of fine-grained data access and assured data deletion in
fog-based industrial applications. To solve the problem, we
proposed a new protocol called CPAD, in which smart objects
encrypt the data with an access structure and only the users
with intended attributes can decrypt it correctly. When the
data needs to be deleted, the fog device can do the operations
such that none of the users can recover the data key, which
makes data irrecoverable. Moreover, CPAD is resilient against
unauthorized user colluding attack. The implementations show
our protocol can be adopted in real-world applications.
90 2 4 6 8 1 00
2 0
4 0
6 0
8 0
1 0 0
1 2 0
1 4 0
1 6 0
1 8 0
2 0 0
 
Com
put
atio
n tim
e (m
s)
T h e  n u m b e r  o f  a t t r i b u t e s  t h e  s m a r t  o b j e c t  o w n s
 v e r i f i c a t i o n  t i t m e
Fig. 4: The time of verification for increased number of
attributes of a smart object
REFERENCES
[1] P. Mell and T. Grance, “Draft NIST Working Definition of Cloud
Computing”, http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/cloudcomputing/index.html,
2009.
[2] F. Tao et al. “CCIoT-CMfg: cloud computing and internet of things-based
cloud manufacturing service system”, IEEE Transactions on Industrial
Informatics, vol. 10, no.2, pp. 1435-1442, 2014.
[3] Y. Li, Y. Yu, G. Min, W. Susilo, J. Ni and K. K. R. Choo. “Fuzzy
identity-based data integrity auditing for reliable cloud storage sys-
tems”. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, DOI:
10.1109/TDSC.2017.2662216, 2017.
[4] Y. Yu, Y. Li, J. Ni, G. Yang, Y. Mu and W. Susilo. “Comments on public
integrity auditing for dynamic data sharing with multiuser modification”.
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 11(3), pp. 658-
659, 2016.
[5] Y. Yu, M. H. Au, G. Ateniese, X. Huang, W. Susilo, Y. Dai and G.
Min. “Identity-based remote data integrity checking with perfect data
privacy preserving for cloud storage”. IEEE Transactions on Information
Forensics and Security, 12(4), pp. 767-778, 2017.
[6] X. Huang and X. Du, Achieving big data privacy via hybrid cloud, in
Proc. of 2014 IEEE INFOCOM Workshops, pp. 512 - 517.
[7] I. Stojmenovic and S. Wen, “The fog computing paradigm: Scenarios
and security issues”, Computer Science and Information Systems, 2014
Federated Conference on. IEEE, pp. 1-8, 2014.
[8] M. Conner, Sensors empower the “Internet of Things”, WorldCat, pp.
32-38, 2010.
[9] S. Fang, et al, “An integrated system for regional environmental moni-
toring and management based on internet of things“, IEEE Transactions
on Industrial Informatics, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 1596-1605, 2014.
[10] Tao, Fei, et al, “IoT-based intelligent perception and access of manu-
facturing resource toward cloud manufacturing,” IEEE Transactions on
Industrial Informatics, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 1547-1557, 2014.
[11] B. Tang, Z. Chen, G. Hefferman, S. Pei, T. Wei, H. He and Q. Yang,
“Incorporating Intelligence in Fog Computing for Big Data Analysis in
Smart Cities”. IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, vol. 13, no.
5, pp. 2140-2150, 2017.
[12] L. Xu, W. He and S. Li, “Internet of things in Industries: A Survey”.
IEEE Trans on Industrial Informatics, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 2233-2243, 2014.
[13] P. Hu, et al, “Fog computing-based face identification and resolution
scheme in internet of things”, IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informat-
ics, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 1910-1920, 2017.
[14] D. Boneh, C. Gentry and B. Waters, “Collusion resistant broadcast
encryption with short ciphertexts and private keys”, Proc. of Crypto 2005,
pp. 258-275, 2005.
[15] L. Cheung, J. A. Cooley, R. Khazan and et al. “Collusion-resistant group
key management using attribute-based encryption”, Group-Oriented
Cryptographic Protocols, vol. 23, 2007.
[16] A. Fiat and M. Naor. “Broadcast encryption”, Annual International
Cryptology Conference. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp. 480-491, 1993.
[17] D. Naor, M. Naor and J. Lotspiech, “Revocation and tracing schemes
for stateless receivers”, CRYPTO 2001, pp. 41-62, 2001.
[18] V. Goyal, O. Pandey, Sahai A and et al, “Attribute-based encryption for
fine-grained access control of encrypted data”, Proceedings of the 13th
ACM conference on Computer and communications security, pp. 89-98,
2006.
[19] J. Bethencourt, A. Sahai and B. Waters. “Ciphertext-policy attribute-
based encryption”, IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 321-
334, 2007.
[20] L. Wu, X. Du, M. Guizani, and A. Mohamed, ”Access Control Schemes
for Implantable Medical Devices: A Survey”, IEEE Internet of Things
Journal, Volume: 4, Issue: 5, Oct. 2017, Pages: 1272-1283.
[21] Z. Guan, T. Yang and X. Du, Achieving Secure and Efficient Data Ac-
cess Control for Cloud-Integrated Body Sensor Networks, International
Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks, Hindawi, Vol. 2015, Article ID
101287, 11 pages, 2015.
[22] X. Hei, X. Du, S. Lin, I. Lee, and O. Sokolsky, Patient Infusion Pattern
based Access Control Schemes for Wireless Insulin Pump System, IEEE
Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Computing, Issue 11, Vol.26,
pp: 3108-3121, Nov. 2015.
[23] X. Hei, X. Du, S. Lin, and I. Lee, “PIPAC: Patient Infusion Pattern based
Access Control Scheme for Wireless Insulin Pump System,” in Proc. of
IEEE INFOCOM 2013, pp. 3030-3038.
[24] J. Reardon, D. A. Basin, S. Capkun. “Secure Data Deletion”. Springer,
2016.
[25] R. Perlman, “File system design with assured delete”, Security in Storage
Workshop. SISW’05. Third IEEE International. IEEE, 2005, 6, pp.-88.
[26] R. Geambasu, T. Kohno, A.A. Levy and et al. “Vanish: Increasing Data
Privacy with Self-Destructing Data”, USENIX Security Symposium, pp.
299-316, 2009.
[27] Y. Tang, P P C. Lee, J C S. Lui and et al. “FADE: Secure overlay cloud
storage with file assured deletion”, Security and Privacy in Communica-
tion Networks, pp. 380-397, 2010.
[28] Y. Xiao, V. Rayi, B. Sun, et Al., A Survey of Key Management Schemes
in Wireless Sensor Networks, Journal of Computer Communications, Vol.
30, Issue 11-12, pp. 2314-2341, Sept. 2007.
[29] X. Du, M. Guizani, Y. Xiao and H. H. Chen,“A Routing-Driven Elliptic
Curve Cryptography based Key Management Scheme for Heterogeneous
Sensor Networks.” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications, Vol.
8, No. 3, pp. 1223-1229, March, 2009.
[30] Y. Xiao, V. Rayi, B. Sun, X. Du, F. Hu, and M. Galloway, “A Survey
of Key Management Schemes in Wireless Sensor Networks,” Journal of
Computer Communications, Vol. 30, Issue 11-12, pp. 2314-2341, Sept.
2007.
[31] X. Du, Y. Xiao, M. Guizani, and H. H. Chen, “An Effective Key
Management Scheme for Heterogeneous Sensor Networks”, Ad Hoc
Networks, Elsevier, Vol. 5, Issue 1, pp 24C34, Jan. 2007.
[32] D. Perito and G. Tsudik. “Secure Code Update for Embedded Devices
via Proofs of Secure Erasure”, ESORICS, pp. 643-662, 2010.
[33] Z. Mo, Q. Xiao, Y. Zhou and et al. “On deletion of outsourced data
in cloud computing”, 2014 IEEE 7th International Conference on Cloud
Computing, pp. 344-351, 2014.
[34] J. Reardon, H. Ritzdorf, D. Basin and et al. “Secure data deletion from
persistent media”, Proceedings of the 2013 ACM SIGSAC conference on
Computer and communications security, pp. 271-284, 2013.
[35] Y. Tang, P. P. C Lee and et al. “Secure overlay cloud storage with
access control and assured deletion”, IEEE Transactions on dependable
and secure computing, vol. 9, no.6, pp. 903-916, 2012.
[36] D. Boneh and M. Franklin, “Identity-based encryption from the Weil
pairing”, CRYPTO 2001, Springer Berlin/Heidelberg, pp. 213-229, 2001.
[37] B. Waters, “Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption: An expressive,
efficient, and provably secure realization”, Public Key Cryptography, pp.
53-70, 2011.
[38] A. Beimel, “Secure schemes for secret sharing and key distribution”.
Technion-Israel Institute of technology, Faculty of computer science, 1996.
[39] A. Sahai, B. Waters, “Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption”, EUROCRYPT
2005, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 457-473, 2005.
[40] https://certivox.org/display/EXT/MIRACL.
